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1. Introduction 
The housing market’s role during the 2000s for generating strong wealth effects and its crucial 
role in the recent financial crises, have attracted quite some attention, leading to a set of stylised 
facts (see e.g. Catte et al., 2004). The most prominent of these stylized facts is that house price 
fluctuations have become larger over the business cycle, attracting the interest of policy makers 
(Girouard et al., 2006). In addition, Mishkin (2007) argues that the transmission of monetary 
policy may be influenced by the housing market, especially through its effect on the cost of 
capital, housing supply and demand, and households’ wealth. In this paper we aim at assessing 
whether the transmission of a common monetary policy shock differes across the US states, and 
howe these differences relate to various observable factors. 
While conventional wisdom suggests that expansionary monetary policies lead to higher 
(real) house prices and higher residential investment, thereby influencing the transmission 
mechanism throughout the economy, the exact quantitative effects on the housing market are 
still under investigation.1 House prices are found to be sensitive to monetary policy shocks, and 
in particular real house prices tend to fall after a contractionary monetary policy shock while 
similar findings are obtained for residential investment (e.g. Bjornland and Jacobsen (2013); 
Calza et al. (2013), Iacoviello and Neri (2010); Jarocinski and Smets (2008); Musso et al. 
(2011); Vargas-Silva (2008)).2 On the other hand, Del Negro and Otrok (2007) find that a local 
component has driven historical fluctuations in house prices; the effect of monetary policy 
shocks on the housing boom is found to be significant, but small. 
Some studies have focused on the heterogeneous effects of monetary policy on housing 
market outcomes. For instance, Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) introduce a heterogeneous-agent 
VAR model for 27 US metropolitan areas and find that there is a negative response of housing 
investment and housing price inflation to an interest rate increase, though heterogeneous across 
regions both in magnitude and duration. Vargas-Silva (2008) estimates regional VAR models 
for the four census regions, finding a contractionary effect of monetary policy on residential 
investment, especially in the Midwest region. Similar results have been obtained by Gupta and 
Kabundi (2009) for the nine census divisions and by Gupta et al. (2010) for the four census 
regions; with the response being heterogeneous across regions.  
Taking the aforementioned conventional wisdom as a starting point, a natural question that 
arises is: does a common (nation-wide) monetary policy shock generate effects on real house 
                                                 
1 Early contributions by Goodhart and Hofmann (2004, 2007, 2008) show the importance of house prices 
for the transmission of monetary policy shocks. 
2  Carstensen et al. (2009) show that the response of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy 
shock is amplified in countries where house prices react more to a monetary policy shock. Iacoviello 
(2000, 2004) reports that the variability of real house prices is mostly explained by monetary factors. 
Finally, Sá et al. (2014) show the effect of monetary policy to be larger in countries with more developed 
mortgage markets 
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prices and residential investment which are across states? And if dissimilarity of responses 
arises, which are the state-level factors that possibly explain the differential responses? In this 
paper, we focus on these questions by first characterising empirically the joint dynamics of 
housing prices, housing investment and interest rates. Drawing on prior work by Vargas-Silva 
(2008), we adopt a simple methodology that allows us to assess the effects of monetary policy 
in the US housing market. A novelty of our approach is that we employ separate VAR models 
for all 50 US states, which allow us to measure these effects in a quantitative manner and assess 
the degree of heterogeneity across states. 
We find that an expansionary monetary policy shock leads, at a national level, to a boom in 
residential investment, which is accompanied by an increase in real house prices. At the state 
level, however, the response of both housing investment and house prices is heterogeneous, 
since these effects are neither uniform across states, nor always significantly different from the 
national aggregate. For instance, we document that for some US states, the effects of monetary 
policy tend to be long-lasting, whereas in other states the effects are extremely short-lived. 
Moreover, in some states the increase of housing investment or house prices is larger than the 
US-wide increase, while in others it is smaller. 
A second set of results we obtain, relates to the determinants of such heterogeneity across 
the US states. In particular we use state-level demographic, socioeconomic and economic 
variables, and assess their importance in explaining the state-level heterogeneity of the 
responses of housing investment and prices to an expansionary monetary policy innovation. 
These factors account for a large fraction of the variability of price responses (between 39% 
and 54%) and a mild fraction of the variability of investment responses (between 14% and 
35%). We find that states with higher fraction of population above 35 years, with higher 
population density and higher income inequality tend to display responses above the national 
aggregate. Instead, states with higher poverty rates and higher percentage of educated 
individuals tend to have responses below the national aggregate. Our results also indicate the 
important role of fiscal variables (e.g. real-estate tax rate), which can be chosen by the local 
governments. We find that states with higher real-estate tax rates have house prices and 
investment respond less relative to the national aggregate. This last finding has important 
implications for the effects of monetary policy in monetary unions: to the extent that local fiscal 
authorities co-ordinate in charging similar property tax rates, the local effects of monetary 
policy are going to be similar to the effects on the union-wide (or nation-wide) aggregate. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly discuss 
the data we employ and the structure of our empirical methodology. Our basic findings are 
discussed in the third section, while the fourth section analyses the variation across the state-
level responses, using state-level covariates. The last section concludes. 
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2. Data and Empirical Methodology 
In this section, we discuss the data we employ in our analysis and give a brief overview of our 
empirical strategy for fleshing-out the effects of monetary policy on the housing market. 
2.1. Data 
In our work, we employ quarterly data covering the period from the first quarter of 1983 to the 
third quarter of 2008.3 In tracing the effects of monetary policy on the housing market, we 
employ two types of data, namely macroeconomic variables that are common across US states 
and variables that are state-specific. The former includes real GDP, the GDP deflator, housing 
investment, house prices and the federal funds rate. The latter include housing investment, real 
house prices and a 30-years fixed mortgage rate for the 50 US states, excluding only the District 
of Columbia. 
Measures of GDP and the GDP deflator are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.4 
We measure housing investment by the number of new housing units authorized by building 
permits, obtained from the US Census Bureau. House prices are measured by the all-
transactions house price index taken from the Federal Housing Finance Agency. The federal 
funds rate is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, while the 30-years fixed 
mortgage rate is obtained from Freddie Mac at the regional level and used at the state level.5 
GDP and house prices are deflated using the GDP deflator. All data except the interest rates are 
in logarithms and seasonally adjusted.6 
2.2 Econometric Specifications 
We employ a set of Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models which have proved successful in 
analysing the effects of monetary policy. Our models take the form: 
                                                 
3 The choice of the sample period reflects two concerns. First, there is evidence that before 1983, 
monetary policy was somewhat different and that a structural break occurs in monetary VARs around 
that time period (see Boivin and Giannoni, 2006, 2010; Clarida et al., 2000). Second, following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the FED started following ‘unconventional’ policies 
e.g. Quantitative Easing. As such policies are hard to be captured by ‘shocks’ to a monetary policy 
interest rates, especially because of the zero-lower bound constraint, we have chosen not to include data 
after the third quarter of 2008 in our analysis. 
4 In particular real GDP measures were obtained by interpolating annual (real) GDP figures using real 
personal income at a quarterly frequency. Similarly, GDP deflators were obtained by interpolating 
annual GDP deflators using state-specific (or region specific) CPI deflators. 
5 Freddie Mac reports long-term mortgage rate for five regions: North Central, North East, South East, 
South West and West. The states that belong to each region are described in the notes of Table A.1 in 
the appendix. 
6 Summary statistics are provided in Table A.1 in the appendix. 
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   ࡮௜଴࢟௜௧ = ࣄ௜ + ࡮௜(ܮ)࢟௜௧ିଵ + ࣁ௜௧   (1) 
where ࢟௜௧ is a ݌ × 1 vector of endogenous variables observed over time ݐ = 1,2, … , ܶ, ࣄ௜ is a 
݌ × 1 vector of constants, ࡮௜(ܮ) is a ݌ × ݌ matrix polynomial in the lag operator, ࣁ௜௧ is a ݌ × 1 
vector of structural disturbances and ࡮௜଴ is a ݌ × ݌ matrix that describes the contemporaneous 
relations among the endogenous variables. As we are interested in assessing the existence of 
heterogeneity across US states, we allow these coefficients to vary across states ݅ = 1,2, . . . ,50.7 
That is we estimate a separate VAR for each state ݅, rather than pooling the coefficients in panel 
VAR model. 
In identifying the monetary policy shock, we follow Christiano et al. (2005) in assuming 
that 
  ݎ௧ = ݂(ℱ௧) + ߳௧     (2) 
where ݎ௧ is the federal funds rate, ݂(∙) is a linear function, ℱ௧ is an information set and ߳௧ is the 
monetary policy shock. We divide ࢟௜௧ as follows: 
࢟௜௧ᇱ = [࢟ଵ௧ᇱ , ݎ௧, ࢟ଶ௜௧ᇱ ] 
The vector ࢟ଵ௧  is composed of the variables contained in ℱ௧  and not contemporaneously 
affected by a monetary policy shock (which are country-wide variables), while vector ࢟ଶ௜௧ 
consists of all the other variables in ℱ௧ (composed of state-specific variables). 
In our analysis, we specify an eight-dimensional VAR with 
࢟௜௧ = [ݕ௧, ݌௧, ݅݊ݒ௧, ℎ݌௧ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
࢟1ݐ
, ݎ௧, ݅݊ݒ௜௧ − ݅݊ݒ௧, ℎ݌௜௧ − ℎ݌௧, ܴ௜௧ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
࢟2݅ݐ
] 
where ݕ௧ is US-wide (log) real GDP in period ݐ, ݌௧ is (log) GDP deflator, ݅݊ݒ௧ is (log) nation-
wide housing investment, ℎ݌௧ is the (log) real house price, ݎ௧ is the federal funds rate, ݅݊ݒ௜௧ −
݅݊ݒ௧  is the (log) relative housing investment for state ݅, ℎ݌௜௧ − ℎ݌௧  is the (log) relative real 
house price and ܴ௜௧ is fixed mortgage rate for 30 years.8 We estimate unrestricted VARs in 
levels, since the monetary transmission mechanism is a short-run phenomenon and unrestricted 
VARs are preferred to first-differenced or VEC models (Bagliano and Favero, 1998; Favero, 
                                                 
7 Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that the standard fixed-effects estimator is inconsistent in dynamic 
panels, if there is slope heterogeneity. 
8 Recall that mortgage rates vary at a regional level. 
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2001). The lag-length was set to two lags in all cases.9 We impose a common number of lags 
in all the VARs we estimate, in order to avoid obtaining impulse responses that are 
heterogeneous across different states, just because there may be differences in the lag structure 
of our models.  
3. Heterogeneity in the Monetary Transmission 
We are interested in the response of state-level housing investment and house prices to an 
economy-wide monetary policy shock, which we normalize to correspond to a 100-basis points 
reduction in the federal funds rate. For completeness, we first discuss the aggregate responses 
before presenting the state-level responses in the subsequent subsection. 
3.1 Responses of Aggregate Variables 
The responses of the national-wide variables are reported in Figure 1.10 We note that after an 
expansionary monetary policy shock corresponding to a reduction in the federal funds rate of 
100 basis points, the federal funds rate is further reduced for about a year, returning to its pre-
shock level after 2.5 years, and increasing further. Following such a disturbance, GDP increases 
(with a delay) and keeps on increasing, and the GDP deflator falls (almost on impact) displaying 
a hump-shaped response. The fact that the GDP deflator falls after a reduction in the federal 
funds rate points towards the so-called ‘price puzzle’ – such a finding was also present in early 
empirical studies (see Christiano et al. (1999) for a discussion). A possible explanation of this 
finding relates to the cost channel of monetary policy that causes prices to fall after an 
expansionary monetary policy shock. When the FED reduces interest rates, part of the 
production costs (related to financing) are also reduced leading aggregate prices to decrease.11 
 We also note that the reduction in the monetary policy rate induces a reduction in the 30-
year fixed-rate mortgage, which also falls for a period of about 2.5 years after the shock. An 
                                                 
9 This is in accordance with standard information criteria for most states in our sample. Using four lags 
in the tradition of Christiano et al. (1999, 2005) does not affect our conclusions in any significant 
manner. 
10 These results are obtained using only nation-wide variables, employing two lags and a constant 
term in the VAR specification – in line with the specifications we employ to study the state-
specific effects of monetary policy. The confidence intervals we report are based on 5000 
bootstrap replications, using the method of Hall (1992) as described in Benkwitz et al. (2001) 
11 An alternative explanation of this finding is that it is due to misidentification of the monetary 
policy shock: the information set available to policy makers includes variables useful in 
forecasting inflation (e.g. commodity prices) that are not included in our specification. However, 
Barth and Ramey (2002) provide evidence in favor of the cost channel of monetary policy: using 
industry level data for the US they show that their findings are robust even when commodity prices 
are included in their VARs. 
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interesting finding is that the reduction in the federal funds rate does not full pass-through to 
the long-term mortgage rate, possibly reflecting ‘agency’ problems, related to the values of 
houses used as collateral for borrowing. Most importantly, housing investment does not jump 
on impact (it takes roughly two quarters for the response to become significant) but increases 
markedly after that, peaking at about 17% roughly 3 years after the shock. Note that this 
corresponds to a change in the existing housing stock – given the definition of housing 
investment – rather than a simple change in values. We also find that real house prices respond 
with a delay (of roughly a year) peaking at about 5.5% almost 4.5 years after the shock -  in 
line with the delayed response of housing investment. 
Figure 1. Impulse Responses of National Aggregates to a Monetary Policy Shock 
 
 
The figure plots the impulse responses of GDP, the GDP deflator, housing investment, real 
house prices and the 30-year fixed mortgage to an expansionary monetary policy shock (100 
basis points). The shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals based on 5000 bootstrap 
replications using the method of Hall (1992) as described in Benkwitz et al. (2001). 
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3.2 State-Level Responses 
The results of the impulse response analysis at the state-level are shown in Figures 2 to 3.12 
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of (relative) housing investment and Figure 3 the 
responses of (relative) house prices. First, we observe that the effects of monetary policy on 
housing investment tend to differ a lot across states. In particular, an expansionary monetary 
policy disturbance leads to an increase in (relative) housing investment for some states (for 
instance California, Delaware, Florida, Maine, New Hampshire, Montana, Utah), to a decrease 
for others (e.g. Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon), while for a group of 
states is quite hard to distinguish (as even the sign of the impulse response changes). The key 
finding is that the estimated (differential) effects of monetary policy on housing investment are 
heterogeneous both in terms of magnitude and in terms of duration of the effect. 
Second, the effects of expansionary monetary policy on real housing prices are also 
heterogeneous across states. We observe that there are cases in which there are large differences 
in the absolute magnitude (for instance in California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, New Jersey, 
Oklahoma, etc.). In many cases, the sign of the effect is different across states (in some states 
the responses are positive i.e. prices rise more than the national aggregate; while in others they 
are negative, i.e. prices rise less than the national aggregate), while the duration of the effect is 
also found to be heterogeneous. 
  To appreciate these findings better, in Figure 4 we report the cross-sectional 
distribution of the (point estimates of) impulse responses of relative investment and house 
prices at horizons of one, two, three and five years after the shock. In Figures 2 and 3 we saw 
that the shape of the responses was different for some states. What is clear from Figure 4 is that 
the distributions of impulse responses are clearly asymmetric. Moreover, the pattern of 
asymmetry is different at different horizons (after the shock). To understand these effects better, 
in the following section we explore factors that might help us in explaining these differences 
across states. 
 Our findings thus far also highlight that the transmission of monetary policy across 
housing markets of the same monetary union need not be homogeneous: the same shock may 
end up increasing prices and investment more in one part of the union and less in some other. 
In this perspective, a one-size-fits-all monetary policy might be problematic. We return to this 
issue below. 
 
                                                 
12 These effects should be interpreted as the effects of monetary policy shocks relative to the effects 
of such shocks to the nation-wide variables (housing investment and housing prices).  
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Figure 2. Impulse Responses of (Relative) Investment Across States 
 
The figure plots the impulse responses of investment in state i relative to the national aggregate. The 
shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals based on 5000 bootstrap replications using the method 
of Hall (1992) as described in Benkwitz et al. (2001). 
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Figure 3. Impulse Responses of (Relative) House Prices Across States 
 
The figure plots the impulse responses of real house prices in state i relative to the national 
aggregate. See also notes for Figure 2. 
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Figure 4. Heterogeneity of IRFs of Housing Prices and Investment 
 
The figure plots the cross-sectional distribution of the (point estimates of) impulse responses of 
housing investment and real house prices in state i relative to the national aggregates, one, two 
three and five years after the monetary policy shock. 
4. Explaining the Heterogeneity in State-Level Responses 
4.1 Empirical Specification 
To understand the differential responses of state-level housing investment and housing prices 
to a monetary policy shock, it is useful to think of factors that potentially influence the effects 
of monetary policy at the state level. In order to evaluate the source of these differences, we use 
the estimated impulse responses as a dependent variable in a set of cross-state regressions. As 
the effects of the monetary policy shocks seem very persistent (see Figures 2 & 3), we focus on 
the impulse responses at horizons of 1-year, 2-years, 3-years and 5-years after the shock and 
regress these on key characteristics that might influence cross-sectional heterogeneity. The 
regressions we estimate are of the form: 
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2
4
6
8
10
12 Response of Relative Investment 5 years after the shock
-0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.040
2
4
6
8
10 Response of Relative House Prices 5 years after the shock
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ܫܴ௜௛ = ܿ + ࢼᇱࢄ௜ + ݑ௜ 
where ܫܴ௜௛ is the estimated the impulse response of state ݅ to a monetary policy shock ℎ periods 
after the shock, and ࢄ௜ is a vector of state-specific explanatory covariates. 
The state-level covariates we consider can be divided into three major categories: 
demographic factors, socio-economic factors and economic variables. 13  The demographic 
factors we consider are the share of adults aged 35-and above and overall population density. 
Presumably, the housing market in states with a higher percentage of population aged-35-or-
older will be more influenced by monetary policy, as people in these age groups are more active 
in the housing market (buying and/or selling).14 So in states with higher percentage of younger 
individuals (less than 35 years old) we expect the responses of both investment and prices to be 
more muted (e.g. lower than the national aggregate). Similarly, population density might also 
influence how housing investment and housing prices respond to favourable monetary 
conditions. Prices in more densely populated states are expected to respond more relative to the 
national aggregate, because of the limited supply of land. Along the same lines, as time passes 
by, the demand for new or better quality houses might also lead the response of investment to 
be higher in more densely populated states. 
The socio-economic factors we consider are income inequality, poverty rate and 
education.15 It is quite clear that poor people generally cannot afford to buy homes, so we 
expect that a higher incidence of poverty rates will lead to responses of both house prices and 
housing investment to be more contained and fall short relative to the national aggregate. 
Likewise, the level of education might affect how people perceive monetary policy and its 
effects on housing market outcomes. More educated people are thus expected to respond less 
aggressively to laxer economic conditions. If this is the case, we expect the higher the fraction 
of educated people in a particular state, the lower the response of both housing investment and 
prices (again relative to the national aggregate). We also feel that measures of income inequality 
are important to the extent that they proxy for groups of borrowing-constrained individuals: the 
higher inequality is, the larger the fraction of individuals that face constraints on borrowing 
                                                 
13 These are averages over the period we consider in our sample. 
14 The percentage of people with age 35 and above, as well as population density has been obtained 
from the US Census Bureau. 
15 Income inequality data comes from Frank (2009). The poverty rate and the percentage of persons 
who have completed secondary education were collected from the US Census Bureau. Bampinas 
et al. (2017) show that income inequality and demographic factors affect the housing wealth effect 
across 48 US states. 
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against permanent income.16 As these constraints are relaxed, individuals that were constrained 
will be more actively involved in the housing market, driving prices and housing investment 
up. 
Finally, the economic variables that we consider are the average property tax rate and the 
percent of homeownership rate.17 The higher the property tax rates in a state, the lower the net 
financial gain from higher house prices and/or from investment in new houses. As such, we 
expect that in states with high property taxes individuals will have less of a motive to invest 
and/or buy new homes; thereby high tax rates should be associated with lower responses of 
both house prices and investment. The effects of the homeownership rate on the other hand are 
unclear. To the extent that houses are viewed as assets, we expect that the higher the degree 
homeownership the more responsive prices and investment will be – as individuals trade more 
actively in the housing market, also seeking new investment opportunities. If, on the other hand, 
houses are mostly seen as a source of a service flow, then a higher degree homeownership could 
well lead to lower responses of both prices and investment. 
4.2 Empirical Findings 
The results from various sets of cross-sectional regressions are reported in Table 1 (for 
investment responses) and Table 2 (for price responses). Looking first at investment one year 
after the shock, we note that states with higher poverty rates, higher percentage of educated 
individuals, and higher property taxes tend to witness responses of housing investment that falls 
short of the response of the national aggregate. Similar findings arise at the two-year horizon, 
the only difference being that higher home ownership rates lead to investment responses that 
are above the national aggregate. The other variables (e.g. age structure, population density and 
income inequality) do not seem to matter for the responses of investment at short time horizons. 
Looking at medium horizons (3 and 5 years after the shock) we find that poverty rates, the 
percentage of educated individuals and property taxes do not explain the differential response 
of investment to a monetary policy shock, unlike what happens at short horizons. In addition, 
we find that population density leads to an increase the difference in the impulse responses 
relative to the national aggregate both at the 3-year and 5-year horizon – in contrast to what 
happens at short horizons. Finally, we note that at a five-year horizon the homeownership rate 
significantly reduces the differential response of investment – contrary to our finding at the 
two-year horizon. One interpretation of this finding is that at shorter horizons, houses are 
moreviewed as “assets” and individuals invest more actively in new houses. As time passes by 
                                                 
16 Mian and Sufi (2011) find that younger and low credit scores households, have stronger home 
equity-based borrowing. 
17 The former has been calculated using data from the tax foundation, while the later comes from 
the US Census Bureau. 
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TABLE 1. Housing Investment Heterogeneity 
Panel A: Housing Investment Heterogeneity at Short Horizons 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 1 year after the shock 2 years after the shock 
Age 35+ -0.0842
 
0.0625 -0.0904 
 
-0.0934 
(0.270) 
 
(0.2709) (0.261) 
 
(0.1992)
Population  0.0008 
 
0.0019 0.0065 
 
0.0230
Density (0.019) (0.0236) (0.014) (0.0152)
Inequality  0.1747 0.4051 -0.0033 0.3045
Gini (0.2375) (0.3126) (0.2192) (0.2452)
Poverty rate -0.2916* -0.5423*** -0.1111 -0.3195*
(0.1648) (0.1820) (0.1332) (0.1641)
Education (%  -0.1460 -0.1776* -0.1095 -0.1654*
High school) (0.1022) (0.0944) (0.0842) (0.0856)
Home  0.0217 0.1494 0.1205 0.2655***
Ownership Rate (0.103) (0.1545) (0.0782) (0.0884)
Real-Estate  -1.0593 -2.6733** -1.1855 -2.1249**
Tax Rate (1.265) (1.2440) (0.9190) (0.9219)
Constant 0.0656 0.0603 0.0038 -0.1377 0.0566 0.1006 -0.0752 -0.1118
(0.181) (0.1541) (0.076) (0.2983) (0.177) (0.1294) (0.0551) (0.2223)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.0021 0.0636 0.0156 0.1489 0.0059 0.0310 0.0684 0.2020
 
(periods after the shock) and houses are viewed more as “capital” that provides a service flow, 
high investment in new houses becomes less attractive. 
Turning next to house price responses we note that states with higher population density and 
higher income inequality tend to have prices that respond more relative to the national 
aggregate. This is so both at short (1-2 years after the shock) but also at medium 
horizons (3-5 years after the shock).18 On the other hand we find that states with higher poverty 
rates display house price responses well below the national aggregate, especially at horizons of 
two years after the shock and beyond. A similar finding arises for the homeownership rate at 
the same horizons after the shock: the higher the homeownership rate the lower the price 
response. 
                                                 
18 The only exception is the effect of income inequality at the three-year horizon which is found to 
be insignificant. 
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Table 1, Panel B: Housing Investment Heterogeneity at Medium Horizons 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 3 years after the shock 5 years after the shock 
Age 35+ -0.2534 
 
-0.2156 -0.2348 
 
-0.0063  
(0.2163) 
 
(0.1970) (0.2848) 
 
(0.2584) 
Population  0.0376*** 
 
0.0465*** 0.0707***
 
0.0590**
Density (0.0124) 
 
(0.0156) (0.0130) 
 
(0.0221) 
Inequality  0.1168 0.2243 0.4652* 0.1603 
(Gini) (0.2218) (0.2634) (0.2528) (0.2320) 
Poverty rate -0.1546 -0.1656 -0.2071 0.0900 
(0.1413) (0.1837) (0.1675) (0.1903) 
Education (%  -0.0999 -0.1342 -0.1618 -0.1374 
High school) (0.0979) (0.1047) (0.1394) (0.1290) 
Home  -0.0583 0.1108 -0.4280*** -0.2953*
Ownership Rate (0.0906) (0.0916) (0.0960) (0.1482) 
Real-Estate  -0.6678 -1.2504 0.3099 0.1794 
Tax Rate (1.0031) (1.0894) (1.2436) (1.4104) 
Constant 0.1521 0.0178 0.0330 0.0578 0.1362 -0.1278 0.2810*** 0.1891 
(0.1460) (0.1407) (0.0640) (0.2356) (0.1943) (0.2013) (0.0658) (0.2180) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.1113 0.0360 0.0171 0.1766 0.1836 0.0808 0.2389 0.3489 
 
Notes for Table 1. Panel A reports cross-sectional regression results for short horizon responses (1 and 2 years 
after the shock) and Panel B regression results for medium horizon responses (3 and 5 years after the shock) of 
housing investment. Columns (1) and (5) report results for demographic variables only; Columns (2) and (6) 
results for socio-economic variables only; Columns (3) and (7) results for economic variables only; and Columns 
(4) and (8) including all covariates.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
We also find that at a two-year and a three-year horizon, the percentage of individuals above 
35 years of age significantly increases the differences of the price responses. Finally, we note 
that real-estate taxes do not have any significant impact on price response differentials at 
relatively short horizons (1-2 years after the shock). Looking at medium horizons (3-5 years 
after the shock) however, our results show that in states with higher property taxation, price 
responses tend to fall short of the national aggregate in a statistically significant manner. 
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TABLE 2. House Price Heterogeneity 
Panel A: Housing Price Heterogeneity at Short Horizons 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 1 year after the shock 2 years after the shock 
Age 35+ 0.0435 
 
0.0737 0.0686 
 
0.1817***  
(0.0757) 
 
(0.0659) (0.0716) 
 
(0.0535) 
Population  0.0158*** 
 
0.0108* 0.0306***
 
0.0203*** 
Density (0.0038) (0.0055) (0.0045) (0.0069) 
Inequality  0.1173** 0.1022* 0.1527* 0.1164* 
(Gini) (0.0452) (0.0599) (0.0876) (0.0689) 
Poverty rate -0.1117*** -0.0676 -0.1951*** -0.1520** 
(0.0370) (0.0424) (0.0515) (0.0609) 
Education (%  0.0250 0.0211 0.0111 0.0079 
High school) (0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0357) (0.0275) 
Home  -0.0535** -0.0235 -0.1219*** -0.0793* 
Ownership Rate (0.0262) (0.0292) (0.0374) (0.0432) 
Real-Estate  0.5982** 0.1638 0.4489 -0.4929 
Tax Rate (0.2556) (0.2561) (0.4173) (0.3797) 
Constant -0.0318 -0.0743** 0.0318 -0.1056* -0.0553 -0.0768 0.0768*** -0.1267* 
(0.0521) (0.0366) (0.0190) (0.0567) (0.0491) (0.0628) (0.0270) (0.0642) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.2352 0.2164 0.1787 0.3940 0.3558 0.2118 0.2019 0.5360 
 
4.3 Discussion and Policy Implications 
Our results above indicate that while income inequality and the percentage of people with age 
above 35 years tend to produce higher price responses, they exert no influence on the responses 
of housing investment. On the other hand, while the level of education is associated with lower 
investment responses, education does not seem to matter for house price responses. Moreover, 
we observe that higher poverty rates and higher population density lead to responses of housing 
investment and prices that are below the national aggregate – this effect holds especially at 
medium horizons as far as investment is concerned.19 We also find that a higher percentage of 
 
                                                 
19 To be more precise the negative effect of poverty rates on housing investment responses is found 
at horizons of two years after the shock and above, while the negative effect of population density 
is found to hold at horizons of three years after the shock and above. 
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Figure 2, Panel B: House Price Heterogeneity at Medium Horizons 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 3 years after the shock 5 years after the shock 
Age 35+ 0.0110 
 
0.1906** -0.0982 
 
0.0717  
(0.1003) 
 
(0.0787) (0.1045) 
 
(0.0765) 
Population  0.0369***
 
0.0236*** 0.0367***
 
0.0270***
Density (0.0049) (0.0072) (0.0046) (0.0067) 
Inequality  0.2068 0.1545 0.2370** 0.1950* 
(Gini) (0.1300) (0.1101) (0.1138) (0.1152) 
Poverty rate -0.2447*** -0.2211*** -0.2178*** -0.2003**
(0.0616) (0.0815) (0.0618) (0.0780) 
Education (%  0.0005 0.0009 -0.0067 -0.0082 
High school) (0.0447) (0.0369) (0.0489) (0.0385) 
Home  -0.1720*** -0.1124** -0.1718*** -0.0853* 
Ownership Rate (0.0440) (0.0485) (0.0385) (0.0460) 
Real-Estate  0.0774 -1.1261** -0.2579 -1.2570**
Tax Rate (0.5214) (0.4967) (0.5359) (0.5062) 
Constant -0.0184 -0.0951 0.1137*** -0.1136 0.0570 -0.1096 0.1177*** -0.0689 
(0.0686) (0.0826) (0.0315) (0.1051) (0.0709) (0.0754) (0.0274) (0.1045) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.3002 0.2062 0.2231 0.5332 0.2878 0.1805 0.2264 0.4948 
 
Notes for Table 2: Panel A reports cross-sectional regression results for short horizon responses (1 and 2 years after 
the shock) and Panel B regression results for medium horizon responses (3 and 5 years after the shock) of real house 
prices. See also notes for Table 1. 
homeownership is associated with response of house prices which fall short of the national 
aggregate, especially at horizons beyond two years after the shock. Along similar lines, we note 
that a high degree of homeownership also leads to responses of housing investment below the 
national aggregate at medium horizons (five years after the shock); but to responses higher at 
shorter horizons (two years after the shock). 
The influence of the variables discussed above on the heterogeneity of the responses of the 
housing variables is important, but these are factors that do not easily change and do not allow 
for policy intervention. However, if such differences are not taken into account by monetary 
authorities, a common shock might well lead to different wealth effects across countries. The 
only variable which can be used as a policy instrument and may be co-ordinated across states 
is the property tax rate. Our findings in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that property taxes make the 
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differential response of housing investment negative at short horizons (up to two years after the 
shock); and the differential response of house prices also negative at longer horizons (three and 
five years after the shock). So, to the extent that a particular state would like to see house prices 
and investment rise faster than the nation-wide aggregates, it would simply have to reduce 
property taxation – so that it is below the nation-wide average property tax rate. This finding 
has an important implication for the effects of monetary policy across a monetary union: local 
governments that want to push for higher residential investment following and expansionary 
monetary policy, they also have to follow an expansionary fiscal policy by reducing property 
taxes, but at the ‘cost’ of higher real house prices.20 
The second important implication that arises is that the only way to achieve a more 
homogeneous effect of monetary policy across states (or countries in a monetary union) would 
be for the states to co-ordinate in a more homogeneous taxation as well – provided that all the 
other factors are not so easily influenced by policy. As far as local governments charge the 
same property tax rate, or at least a tax rate that is close to the nation-wide (or union-wide) 
average, the effects of monetary policy are going to be more similar across states. 
5. Conclusions 
The goal of this paper has been to investigate the effect of monetary policy on real house prices 
and housing investment, as these are important determinants of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. To this end, we estimated VAR models for all 50 US states, in order to assess the 
differential effect of a common monetary policy on real house prices and investment. Our first 
set of findings (at the national level) indicates that our results are consistent with the cost 
channel of monetary policy, under which an expansionary monetary policy shock leads to a 
(temporary) fall in aggregate prices. However national residential investment and national (real) 
house prices are found to increase. Our second set of empirical findings suggests that 
transmission of monetary policy is heterogeneous across US states: in most cases, the responses 
of residential investment and real house prices to a common stimulus differ markedly across 
different states relative to the national aggregate.  
In order to identify sources of this heterogeneity in responses, we have resorted to a set of 
cross-sectional regressions. In these models, the dependent variables were the impulse 
responses across the US states and the explanatory variables were a set of demographic, socio-
economic and economic variables. We find that these variables explain between 18% and 35% 
of the variation of investment responses and between 39% and 54% of the variation of price 
responses. One important conclusion that comes out of these results, is that a common monetary 
policy that does not take into account differences of such factors across countries (most of 
                                                 
20 It could well be the case that such a reduction is property taxes is budget neutral. But even in this 
case, lower property taxes are going to fuel both residential investment and real house prices. 
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which are beyond the control of monetary authorities), will end up influencing house prices and 
investment in different ways across countries, introducing heterogeneity and creating different 
wealth effects – leading to differential welfare gains and losses. 
A second set of implications relates to property taxes, which are an important driver of this 
heterogeneity: local governments may enhance residential investment (relative to the national 
aggregate) by reducing their tax rates, at the ‘cost’ of rising house prices. On the other hand, if 
local governments decide (or are forced to by some commitment mechanism) to coordinate on 
the property tax rates they charge, the effects of monetary policy are going to be more 
homogeneous. Note that this can be achieved without local governments having to charge the 
same tax rate. Rather, they need to charge property tax rates that are close to the nation/union-
wide average. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean Minimum Maximum
 Std. 
Dev. 
 
Observations
Panel A: US-Wide and Regional Variables 
(log) Real GDP 16.0517 15.5959 16.4052 0.2320 103
(log) GDP Deflator -0.2192 -0.5622 0.0872 0.1791 103
(log) Housing Investment 15.3186 14.7516 15.7154 0.2150 103
(log) Real House Prices -0.3175 -0.5468 0.0426 0.1785 103
Federal Funds Rate 0.0537 0.0100 0.1139 0.0246 103
30-years fixed mortgage rate  
   US-wide 0.0847 0.0551 0.1449 0.0228 103
   North Central Region 0.0853 0.0559 0.1442 0.0227 103
   North East Region 0.0846 0.0558 0.1463 0.0229 103
   South East Region 0.0845 0.0548 0.1451 0.0229 103
   South West Region 0.0845 0.0547 0.1460 0.0228 103
   West Region 0.0848 0.0543 0.1441 0.0230 103
Panel B: State-Specific Variables 
(log) Relative Real House Prices 0.0330 -0.6361 0.7300 0.1693 5150
(log) Real House Prices -0.2845 -1.1821 0.2061 0.2342 5150
(log) Relative Housing Investment -7.0398 -10.7515 -4.0631 1.1793 5150
(log) Housing Investment 8.2788 4.4659 11.4053 1.1944 5150
Notes for Table A.1: Panel A reports descriptive statistics for US-wide variables, whereas panel B for state-specific 
variables. The 30-years fixed mortgage rates at the regional level are common for all states belonging to a particular 
region. These are defined as: (1) North Central Region:  IA, IL, IN, MI, MN, ND, OH, SD, WI; (2) North East Region: 
AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN; (3) South East Region: IA, IL, IN, MI, MN, ND, OH, SD, WI; (4) South West 
Region: AR, CO, KS, LA, MO, NE, NM, OK, TX, WY; (5) West Region: AK, AZ, CA, HI, ID, MT, NV, OR, UT, 
WA. The time span is 1983:Q1 – 2008:Q3. 
 
 
 
